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ABSTRACT 
 
The burning issue of delegating pricing authority to the sales force is of interest to marketing 
academics as well as practitioners in a wide variety of consumer, industrial and institutional 
marketing situations. There are many studies which examine the decision to delegate ultimate 
pricing authority (PA) to the sales force. Additionally the marketing literature encompasses many 
theoretical rationales for giving sales personnel authority to set prices. Conversely there are also 
empirical research outcomes that debate the opposite scenario, asserting that giving salespeople 
the highest degree of pricing authority engendered the lowest sales and profit results. It is difficult 
to find any study which has investigated or explored this issue from the salesperson’s point of 
view. In this study, we examine the perception of the sales force on the price authority they have 
been given. Supported by the sales motivation theory, we, specifically, examine the sales force 
perception of the decentralized (delegated) price authority to them and perceived firm 
performance. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
t is of interest to marketing academics as well as practitioners in a variety of consumer, industrial and 
institutional marketing situations to explore in-depth the topic of delegating pricing authority to the sales 
force.  There are a number of studies which examine the decision to delegate ultimate pricing authority to 
the sales force (Bhardwaj 2001; Greene, Walls, Sechrest 1996; Joseph 2001; Lal 1986; Stephenson, Cron, and Frazier 
1979).  The marketing literature also encompasses many theoretical rationales defending giving sales personnel 
authority to set prices (Lal 1986; Weinberg 1975) as long as the incentives are properly based on gross margins and 
not on sales volumes. On the other hand, there are also empirical research outcomes that debate the opposite scenario 
(Joseph 2001; Mishra and Prasad 2004; Stephenson, Cron, and Frazier 1979), asserting that giving sales people the 
highest degree of pricing authority engendered the lowest sales and profit results, generating less sales effort, and 
more aggressive price reductions on the salesperson part (Stephenson, Cron, and Frazier 1979) .  
 
 “Agency theory describes relationships in which one party delegates work to another and focuses on 
determining the most efficient contract to govern a particular relationships given the characteristics of the parties 
involved. Agency theory also declares that one party (the principal) depends on another party (agency) to undertake 
some action on the principal’s behalf. It is clear, that most agency models define efficiency from the principal’s point 
of view.” (Bergen, Dutta, Walker 1992) No scholarly journals, and very few studies (in fact none to our knowledge 
except for the survey done by Associated Equipment Distributors, Inc. magazine), have looked into this issue from the 
agent’s, which is in our case the salesperson’s, point of view. In this study, we examine the perception of sales force 
on the price authority they have been given. Supported by the sales motivation theory, we, specifically, examine the 
sales force perception of the decentralized (delegated) price authority to them and perceived firm performance. 
 
An argument for price delegation (decentralized pricing) is that the salesperson is the only one who is able to 
judge and decide the best circumstances in terms of the customer’s willingness and readiness to pay the price. 
Providing pricing authority (PA) to individual salespeople permits them to use their superior information about 
customer readiness to pay and in that way closes a greater number of transactions which in turn increases sales volume 
(Joseph 2001). On the other hand providing salespeople with PA leads to the possibility of “suboptimal tradeoffs 
I 
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between price and effort” that means price latitude causes sales people to take the path of least resistance, that is, 
discounting rather than spending a greater effort on selling (Joseph 2001; Stephenson, Cron, and Frazier 1979). 
 
Within this paper we firstly provide the background to this research, then, we outline the research design and 
methodology. This overview is followed by our hypotheses in relation to agency theory and the salesperson’s point of 
view based on this existing literature review, and the essential features of our research setting. We then give our 
explicit results for each of the hypotheses. Before presenting our views and conclusions, we indicate our study’s 
limitations and finally we present the managerial implications of our findings to assist managers charged with the 
price delegation decisions, and to guide academics by indicating further research areas.  
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Stephenson, Cron, and Frazier’s study (1979) identified five factors, in terms of the optimality of delegating 
pricing authority to the sales force, which they believed needed further research. These factors were; 
 
1. Sales behaviour - what types of selling behaviour evolve when salespeople have pricing authority. 
2. Market knowledge - the amount of superior knowledge they have about customer’s willingness to pay. 
3. Competitive behaviour – what kind of competitive behaviour develops when the sales force has price setting 
authority. 
4. Purchase environment – how does the knowledge that the salesperson has pricing authority effect bargaining and 
negotiation situations. 
5. Control of commission systems – existing sales compensation systems basing sales commission on gross margins 
may not provide adequate control over the use of pricing authority by the sales force. 
 
Joseph (2001) examines the net effects of two of the factors of Stephenson, Cron, and Frazier’s study (1979), 
namely behaviour of the salespeople when given price autonomy, specifically “whether PA would lead to suboptimal 
tradeoffs between price and effort”, and whether this PA would “enable them to use their superior information about 
customers’ willingness to pay”. The third factor concerned with competition, and competitor’s reactions to PA and the 
fifth factor with regard to the control value of gross-margin commission systems on salesperson compensation have 
been investigated by Bhardwaj (2001). His findings add weight to previous discussions in the area of PA most 
especially with regard to tradeoffs.  
 
While some research has been undertaken on the above mentioned factors some areas have still been ignored. 
Trust is a very important aspect of salesperson-sales manager relationships which causes job satisfaction among 
salespeople which in turn leads to high sales performance (Flaherthy and Pappas 2000). High sales performance 
clearly has a flow-on effect to higher overall firm profit and performance. Trust is the perceived credibility, reliability, 
and benevolence of a target (Doney and Canon 1997; Ganesan, Weitz and John 1993; Kumar, Sheer and Steenkamp 
1995). In addition to trust, one of the important facets of the sales manager’s role is his influence on the salesperson’s 
motivation (Flaherthy and Pappas 2000; Yammarino 1997). The simplest model of performance posited is ability x 
motivation (Gallagher and Einhorn 1976). Where trust is considered  a sub-element of motivation, and delegating 
authority a sub-element of trust, in turn leads us to the conclusion that salespeople motivation is highly dependent on 
their level of given authority. Specifically, in this paper we examine the price authority delegated to salespeople and 
how the salespeople perceive such an authority, as well as its indirect effects on salespeople’s motivation.  
 
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This research aims to gain insights into the salesperson’s perceptions of delegated price authority. By looking 
at available literature we have seen the gaps which need to be filled in the field of PA.  Hypotheses that evaluate the 
effects of the variables have been collected from the existing literature, and these are developed in light of the existing 
gaps. Accordingly the questionnaire has been formed, and tested via a survey method within the field work.  Since this 
research is exploratory in nature, and also being the first of its kind (to our knowledge) with an agency perspective, 
non-probability sampling techniques have been used. Among them, the most appropriate was a convenience sampling 
approach.  The chosen sample was salespeople within the construction industry who were together at the same time, 
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under the same roof; i.e. in a single place, a trade fair. The basic limitation for this sampling method is that the 
resulting sample may not be representative of the entire industrial population.  
 
The questionnaire was handed out at a trade fair/exposition, called “Construction Days”, where sales 
representatives of several construction companies were present.  It was therefore one specific industry where the 
majority of the salespeople were men, in this particular case 93%. Of the 115 questionnaires which were distributed, 
only 62 were collected or handed back which is response rate of 54 %. Of the 62 questionnaires collected, only 50 
were completed correctly giving us an effective response rate of 43%. This is an interesting finding in its’ own right 
since it was assumed that we had a somewhat captive audience and would have expected a higher return percentage. 
In hindsight the chosen respondents and trade fair may have caused the lack of interest, attention and concentration on 
the survey, since many respondents were rather more focused on their customers at this time. 
 
The questionnaire used consists of twenty questions. The first two open-ended questions were asked in order 
to evaluate the perception of salespeople about their own and the firm’s success. These questions were set because it 
was believed that having the same future goals would be a significant criterion in allocating PA. The third question 
was asked to ascertain whether the salesperson in question had PA. Questions four to six were designed as indicators 
of the salesperson’s conformity levels. These questions were in statement form and using a 5 point Likert scale 
measure, the respondents were asked to indicate how strongly they agree with these statements on PA levels. The 
fifth, seventh, and ninth questions were asked in order to determine the level of importance of pricing authority’s  
affect on motivation level, prestige in customer’s eyes (opinion), and efforts spent to close the sale, respectively, from 
a salesperson’s perspective. The remaining questions were related to the compensation system, and socio-
demographic facts such as age, gender, marital status, education degree, and monthly income level etc. 
 
HYPOTHESES AND RESULTS 
 
Match Of Objectives 
 
A mutually beneficial working relationship with the salespeople is necessary if a firm is to accomplish its 
objective. A profitable operational link based on mutual trust and respect must be built between the company and the 
salesperson. To do so, the company must respect the employee’s goals and objectives, while the employee must  show 
deference to and follow the company's objectives. Hence, specific objectives which have been set based on company 
criteria and resources should be clearly communicated to the salesperson. Besides, in order to attain the goal of a 
sound firm performance, company objectives should match salesperson’s objectives.  
 
As per agency theory, the firm hires the salesperson to maximize  its expected profit in return for 
compensation (Bergen, Shantanu, and Orville 1992; Coughlan and Sen 1989) while the salesperson will expend effort 
on selling that maximizes his/her own expected financial benefit (Basu, Lal, Srinivasan, and Staelin 1985). Equitable 
and shared objectives would allow a company to increase its firm performance. Based on this theory, we speculate 
whether delegating PA to the salesperson would affect shared objectives of salesperson and the firm. Hence, our first 
hypothesis: 
 
H1:  Match of the objectives of the salesperson and the firm is related to the ownership of price authority. 
 
Price Authority, Sales Volume And Firm’s Profit 
 
Theory also supports the view that decentralized pricing (i.e. delegating price authority to the sales force) 
will have a positive affect on the sales volume, and a negative effect on the firm’s profit and gross margin which is net 
sales minus cost of goods sold expressed as a percentage of net sales (Stephenson, Cron, and Frazier 1979). “It is 
expected that salespeople with price latitude will tend to discount prices in order to overcome sales resistance. Price 
latitude will seldom be used, to sell at prices above list.” (Stephenson, Cron, and Frazier 1979) The conjecture 
therefore is whether this view about the relationship of PA’s effect on sales volume and PA’s effect on firm’s profit is 
also been shared by the sales force when asked about their perceptions on this issue. Hence our second hypothesis: 
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H2:  As per sales force perceptions, PA’s effect on sales volume is related to PA’s effect on firm’s profit. 
 
 
Table 1: Match Of Objectives, And Having PA Cross-Tabulation 
Count 
Having PA 
 
Yes, I 
have PA 
No, I 
don’t 
have 
PA 
TOTAL CHI-SQUARE TEST Value df Asymp.Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact 
Sig. 
(2-
sided) 
Exact 
Sig. 
(1 
sided) 
Match of 
objectives: 
Match 
Don’t match 
Total 
 
 
13 
28 
41 
 
 
3 
6 
9 
 
 
16 
34 
50 
Pearson Chi-Square 
Continuity 
correction(a) 
Likelihood ratio 
Fisher’s Exact Test 
Linear-by-linear 
assoc. 
N of valid cases 
,0009(b) 
,000 
,009 
 
,009 
50 
1 
1 
1 
 
1 
,925 
1,000 
,925 
 
,925 
 
 
 
1,000 
 
 
 
,605 
(a) Computed only for a 2x2 table (b) 1 cells (25,0%) have expected count less than 5. The min. expected count is 2,88.  
 
 
Our first hypothesis is not supported. Grouping limited authority and full authority (Joseph 2001) responses 
in having PA make the outcome worse. Thus, we conclude that ownership of PA does not affect the match of the 
salesperson’s and firms’ objectives. 
 
 
Table 2: PA On Sales Volume*, And PA’s Effect On Profit Of The Firm Cross-Tabulation 
Count 
PA effect 
on firm’s 
profit 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Total CHI-SQUARE 
TEST 
Value df Asymp.
Sig.  
(2-sided) 
PA on 
sales 
volume: 
Neutral 
Agree 
Strongly  
agree 
Total 
 
2 
5 
6 
13 
 
5 
4 
4 
13 
 
4 
6 
5 
15 
 
1 
2 
3 
6 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
 
12 
18 
20 
50 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
Likelihood 
ratio 
Linear-by-
linear assoc. 
N of valid cases 
3,899 
(a) 
4,436 
 
,257 
50 
8 
8 
 
1 
,867 
,816 
 
,612 
(a) 11 cells (73.3%) have expected count less than 5.  (b)  The min. expected count is ,72.  
 
 
We expected to see a correlation between perceived PA effect on sales volume and perceived firm’s 
performance. Since it is obvious to expect that with discounted prices the salesperson would increase her/his sales 
volume at a cheaper unit price, which then will result in a cut or decrease of the sales revenue and the firm’s profit. 
Unpredictably, salespeople did not see any association or relation. Thus, our second hypothesis is not supported. 
 
Price Authority, Sales Volume, And Compensation 
 
As mentioned earlier, theory supports the view that when the sales force has price authority they will tend to 
give discounts easily (Joseph 2001; Stephenson, Cron, and Frazier 1979) to increase their volume of sales. Price 
authority would be an incentive on discounting for the salesperson if his performance is measured by his sales volume, 
and a discouragement on discounting for the salesperson if his performance is measured by the sales revenue, gross 
margin, or firm’s profit. Since the performance measurement in these cases becomes a proxy for the compensation (or 
bonus) method in the field of sales, we investigated the salespeople’s view on these topics with the following 
hypothesis:  
 
H3:  PA’s effect on sales volume is related to its effect on salesperson’s salary (compensation). 
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Table 3: PA Effect On Sales Volume, And PA’s Effect On Salesperson’s Compensation/Income Cross-Tabulation 
Count 
PA  
effect on 
compensation 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Total CHI-
SQUARE 
TEST 
Value df Asym. 
Sig.  
(2-sided) 
PA on sales 
volume: 
Neutral 
Agree 
Strongly agree 
Total 
 
3 
8 
4 
15 
 
4 
6 
7 
17 
 
2 
1 
2 
5 
 
3 
2 
2 
7 
 
 
1 
5 
6 
 
12 
18 
20 
50 
Pearson 
Chi-
Square 
Likelihood 
ratio 
Linear-by-
linear 
assoc. 
N of valid 
cases 
9,170
a 
9,837 
 
1,242 
     50 
8 
8 
 
1 
,328 
,277 
 
,265 
(a) 11 cells (73.3%) have expected count less than 5.  The min. expected count is 1,20.  
 
 
As the chi square test indicates, salespeople see no association of the price authority’s (discounts) effect on 
sales volume and its’ influence on their salary or compensation. This is a surprising result and proves to us as 
indicated in the theory that the salespeople are more interested in the sales action itself and do not think so much about 
its consequences. Salespeople sometimes look more for the sale vs. the best interest of the dealership overall (Reilly 
2003). In fact, the quite complex salesperson’s behaviour is shown in “motivational responses toward quota 
achievement versus maximization of sales or income” (Stephenson, Cron, and Frazier 1979; Winer 1973). H3 is not 
supported from salesperson’s point of view. This result forced us to probe this outcome further with the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H3a:  PA’s effect on sales volume is related to the effect of price on sales volume. 
 
PA’s Effect On Sales Volume, And Price Effect On Sales Volume 
 
 
Table 4: Effect On Sales Volume And Price Effect On Sales Volume Cross-Tabulation 
Count 
PA effect on sales 
volume.  
Neutral 
 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
TOTAL CHI-SQUARE 
TEST 
Value df Asymp. 
Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Effect of price on sales 
volume: 
Strongly disagree 
Disagree  
Neutral  
Agree 
Strongly agree 
Total 
 
 
 
7 
2 
2 
1 
12 
 
 
2 
4 
1 
8 
3 
18 
 
 
2 
7 
4 
5 
2 
20 
 
 
4 
18 
7 
15 
6 
50 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
Likelihood ratio 
Linear-by-linear 
assoc. 
N of valid cases 
8,045a 
9,039 
 
,015 
50 
8 
8 
 
1 
,429 
,339 
 
,901 
(a) 11 cells (73.3%) have expected count less than 5.  The min. expected count is ,96.  
 
 
As expected this outcome does support the result of the previous hypothesis (H3) that means that H3a is also 
not supported. Salespeople do not even see an association between price effect of sales volume and PA effect on sales 
volume. 
 
All these striking results show and support the view of theory that salespeople do focus on sales action itself 
(Reilly, 2003) and do not make further associations about the effects of any discounts from the list price to sales 
volume, sales revenues, firm’s profit, and compensation. 
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Given these results we decided to dig deeper into the area of motivation. This decision was based on the 
strong link between power, authority and performance, and motivation in the theory. Hence our next hypothesis: 
 
H4:  PA’s effect on motivation is related to its effect on salesperson’s performance. 
 
PA’s Effect On Motivation And Performance 
 
 
Table 5: PA’s Effect On Sales Person’s Performance, And PA’s Effect On Sales Person’s Motivation Cross-Tabulation 
Count 
PA effect 
on sales 
person’s 
motivation  
Disagree Neutral 
 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Total CHI-SQUARE 
TEST 
Value df Asymp. 
Sig.  
(2-sided) 
PA effect on 
sales person’s 
performance: 
Disagree  
Neutral  
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Total 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
1 
4 
8 
2 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
25 
29 
 
 
 
3 
8 
12 
27 
50 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
Likelihood 
ratio 
Linear-by-
linear assoc. 
N of valid cases 
58,259
a 
 
51,346 
 
34,006 
 
50 
9 
9 
 
1 
,000 
,000 
 
,000 
(a) 13 cells (81.3%) have expected count less than The min. expected count is ,06.  
 
 
At last, salespeople see a significant and strong association between PA’s effect on salesperson’s motivation 
and performance. H4 is supported. 
 
PA’s Effect On Effort To Close The Sale And On The Easiness Of Sale 
 
Theory supports the view that a negative feature of PA to practitioners would be that PA will cause a 
suboptimal substitution of selling effort by price discounting (Joseph 2001). Providing PA to salespeople may make 
them too compliant in the negotiation situation (Dolan and Simon 1996, p. 313). Giving price discounts would 
generally be expected to result in easier sales, and thus make it trouble-free and demand less effort from the 
salesperson in closing the sale. This finding leads to the next hypothesis. 
 
H5: PA’s effect on the effort to close the sale is related to its effect on the easiness of sales.  
 
 
Table 6: PA’s Effect On The Effort To Close The Sales*, And PA’s Effect On The Easiness Of Sales Cross-Tabulation 
Count 
PA effect on the 
easiness of sales.  
Neutral 
 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Total Chi-Square Test Value df Asymp.Sig.  
(2-sided) 
PA effect on the 
effort to close the 
sales: 
Strongly disagree 
Disagree  
Neutral  
Agree 
Strongly agree 
Total 
 
 
 
1 
2 
2 
1 
 
6 
 
 
 
3 
12 
4 
5 
1 
25 
 
 
 
3 
7 
3 
3 
3 
19 
 
 
 
7 
21 
9 
9 
4 
50 
Pearson Chi-Square 
Likelihood ratio 
Linear-by-linear 
assoc. 
N of valid cases 
4,012a 
4,134 
 
,455 
50 
8 
8 
 
1 
,856 
,845 
 
,500 
(a) 13 cells (86,7 %) have expected count less than 5.  The min. expected count is ,48.  
 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – February 2006                                                      Volume 4, Number 2 
 41 
Another nonconforming and unexpected result is that salespeople do not perceive any correlation between 
PA effect on the effort to close the sale and PA effect on the easiness of sale. Consequently our H5 hypothesis is also 
not supported. This outcome made us curious and subsequently we investigated further to understand what the 
underlying issue here was. 
 
PA’s Effect on the Easiness of Sale and Price Effect on Sales Volume 
 
H5a:  PA’s effect on the easiness of sales is related to the effect of price on sales volume. 
 
 
Table 7: PA’s Effect On The Easiness Of Sales*, And Effect Of Price On Sales Volume Cross-Tabulation 
Count 
Effect of 
price on 
 sales 
volume 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Total CHI-
SQUARE 
TEST 
Value df Asymp.Sig.  
(2-sided) 
PA effect 
on the 
easiness of 
sales: 
Neutral 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Total 
 
 
1 
1 
2 
4 
 
 
2 
8 
8 
18 
 
 
1 
3 
3 
7 
 
 
2 
9 
4 
15 
 
 
 
4 
2 
6 
 
 
6 
25 
19 
50 
Pearson 
Chi-
Square 
Likelihood 
ratio 
Linear-by-
linear 
assoc. 
N of valid 
cases 
3,597a 
 
4,286 
 
,159 
50 
8 
8 
 
1 
,892 
,830 
 
,690 
(a) 11 cells (73.3%) have expected count less than 5.  The min. expected count is ,48.  
 
 
PA’s Effect on the Easiness of Sales, and its Effect on Sales Volume 
 
H5b: PA’s effect on the easiness of sales is related to its effect on sales volume. 
 
 
Table 8: PA’s Effect On Easiness Of Sales *, And PA’s Effect On Sales Volume Cross-Tabulation 
Count 
 
PA effect on 
sales volume 
Neutral 
 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Total CHI-SQUARE 
TEST 
Value df Asymp. 
Sig.  
(2-sided) 
PA effect on 
easiness of sales: 
Neutral  
Agree 
Strongly agree 
Total 
 
 
1 
5 
6 
12 
 
 
3 
11 
4 
18 
 
 
2 
9 
9 
20 
 
 
6 
25 
19 
50 
Pearson Chi-Square 
Likelihood ratio 
Linear-by-linear 
assoc. 
N of valid cases 
3,131a 
3,252 
 
,000 
50 
4 
4 
 
1 
,536 
,517 
 
,983 
(a) 4 cells (44,4 %) have expected count less than 5.  The min. expected count is 1,44.  
 
 
The fact that our previous hypothesis (H5), was not supported, is confirmed with these outcomes. 
Surprisingly again, salespeople did not perceive any association between PA’s effect on the easiness of sale and the 
effect of price on sales volume, nor do they associate PA’s effect on the easiness of sales with its effect on sales 
volume. H5a and H5b are not supported. 
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Discussions, Limitations, and Further Research 
 
In theory many academics and practitioners believe that PA significantly increases the salesperson’s chances 
of making a sale, and as a result favour giving salespeople PA. In other words they support decentralized pricing 
authority, which is delegating pricing decisions to the sales force. This view is further supported by the idea that 
responsibility, power, control, autonomy, authority, and job satisfaction are associated. Moreover, salespeople have 
more complex behaviour and perceptions of incentives than just a simple pay check or bonus. Salespeople, some of 
whom, may be in the progress of moving towards a sales manager position and as such should be facing 
circumstances where they have to make more independent decisions. Often in these circumstances pricing is the most 
important decision they have to make and is most relevant to their field. Ultimately, a salesperson is the one who 
decides the relative importance and size of the prospects, since they are the ones calling, and visiting on both potential 
prospects and current customers, influencing them, and hopefully closing the sale. Therefore a salesperson’s role 
should not be limited to just being a messenger boy delivering information to and from the firm. Clearly his customers 
and prospects would value him more when they perceive that he is powerful in decision making, since most customers 
prefer to do business with credible and decisive partners. And as every salesperson is no doubt aware, there is no 
better time than present to close a sale with a willing customer. Taking PA out of the hands of the salesperson would 
slow down the process of the transaction and additionally make the salesperson look less important and authoritative 
to the customer. By the time the sales person checks the price with the management, the customer may be exposed to 
competitor’s offers, or just simply change his mind  by being distracted from that unique and magic selling 
atmosphere.  
 
On the other hand, researchers who took the opposing view basically believe the practice of giving PA to the 
salesperson causes lower gross margins and there are several empirical research study results which prove this. Our 
study in  a way also supports this view, since salespeople see no associations between their PA and sales or profit of 
the firm, this would lead to the conclusion that they would use their pricing authority to just close the sale. 
 
This study has its limitations, mainly in how it was administered. As previously pointed out the questionnaire 
was handed out at a trade fair/exposition, called “Construction Days, where sales representatives of several 
construction companies were present.  It was therefore one specific industry where the majority of the salespeople 
were men, in this particular case 93%. The basic limitation of this convenience sampling method is that the resulting 
sample may not be representative of the entire industrial population. However the 43% response is promising and 
allows a contribution to be made to the existing literature and also paves the way for future research.  
 
For the marketing and sales management, delegating PA to sales force is a very significant matter.  This 
subject deserves further investigation in industrial and services marketing situations, as well as international marketing 
conditions since the results may differ given the education level and circumstances of the sales force working for 
those industries. As we pointed out other researchers have examined in detail four of the five factors identified by 
Stephenson, Cron, and Frazier’s study (1979) as needing further research but one still remains untouched, namely 
negotiation circumstances, that is buyer’s negotiating skills and abilities in light of the delegation of pricing authority.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
By testing our hypotheses and analysing the frequency tables, we were faced with some contradictory results. 
Even though sales people see having PA as an appealing incentive tool, they do not associate its effect with sales 
volume, and firm’s performance. They do, however, perceive that the length of time spent working at the same 
corporation affects their loyalty to the firm, and that their motivation is undoubtedly related with performance of 
salespeople. The fundamental effects of having PA on the salespeople are that they perceive PA as an enhancing tool 
to increase motivation, performance, and their respect and dignity from their customer’s point of view. This was found 
despite the existence of a minority of the salespeople who perceive authority as a burden on their shoulders. Results 
show that having price authority and its different effects on sales volume, and firm profit has not been understood 
clearly and completely by the sales force. Almost half of the group has the view that having PA would increase the 
sales volume and subsequently the firm’s profit, whereas the other half claim the opposite. Different arrangements of 
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questions in our questionnaire using Joseph’s (2001) scale, and research setting, regarding salespeople having limited, 
and full authority, did not change our result. 
 
To the extent that one can generalize from this sample of 50 salespeople from the construction industry, one 
can conclude that the strategy of delegating price authority to the sales force is likely dysfunctional except if its 
function is motivating the salespeople. Considering that motivation can be achieved through other circumstances and 
through other more powerful and influential tools (Joseph and Thevaranjan 1998) giving sales people PA does not 
make a lot of sense from a managerial viewpoint.  One may even deduce that given the negative outcomes of 
delegating PA, in that from the salesperson’s point of view, it is neither associated with their income and the firms’ 
profit nor it is appreciated by the sales force, pursuing a decentralized pricing strategy is not necessary and in fact 
wasted. Literature has even speculated that since firms that give their salespeople a high degree of PA had consistently 
poor performance, providing high PA to sales force may be symptomatic of a pattern of relatively weak marketing and 
sales management (Stephenson, Cron, and Frazier 1979).  
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